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Abstract
In this paper we estimate a model where in°ation, a measure of de facto
central bank independence and an index of de facto exchange rate regime are
simultaneously determined by a set of economic, political and institutional
variables. De facto central bank independence is hampered by socio-political
turbulence and bene¯ts from the balance of powers between the executive and
the parliament. In°ation is explained by de facto central bank independence,
by the level and volatility of public expenditure and by the de facto exchange
rate regime. Openness (real and ¯nancial) a®ects in°ation through the ex-
change rate regime channel. Success in controlling in°ation, in turn is crucial
to sustain central bank independence and exchange rate stability.
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A constitutional or institution design stage lays down some fundamental
aspects of the rules of the game which cannot be easily changed. Once
an independent central bank has been set up, an international agreement
over the exchange rate has been signed, or an in°ation target has been
explicitly assigned to the central bank, it has some staying power, in the
sense that change in institution ex post is costly or takes time. Persson
and Tabellini (2001), p.435
Research in political macroeconomics sees actual policies as endogenous equi-
librium outcomes. As the policy-making process depends on institutional arrange-
ments, ¯xing institutions is therefore crucial to improve policy outcomes. This has
well known consequences in monetary economics where the key implication of the
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) time inconsistency ap-
proach, is that central bank independence or a ¯xed exchange rate are important
tools to remove the in°ation bias.
However, setting legal arrangements does not guarantee the desired policy out-
comes. For instance, it is di±cult to detect a robust negative correlation between
indicators of de jure central bank independence and in°ation beyond the restricted
sample of high income economies. Cukierman et al. (1992) show instead that cen-
tral bankers' turnover rates, an indicator of de facto central bank independence,
explain cross-country in°ation di®erentials. Similarly, the announcement of a ¯xed
exchange rate is not su±cient to discipline domestic monetary policy as there are
important di®erences between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes (Reinhart
and Rogo®, 2004; Alesina and Wagner, 2005; Carmignani et al., 2005).
We see two possible rationalisations for the apparent discrepancies between some
de jure institutions and de facto policies. The ¯rst is that, in practice, isolating
monetary institutions from political pressure may be a di±cult task. For instance,
empirical research supports the view that even in the US there are indirect ways
for politicians to a®ect monetary policy outcomes, despite the independent status
of the Fed (Alesina, 1987; Froyen et al., 1997; Havrilesky, 1994; McGregor, 1996).
The second stems from a rigourous extension of the time inconsistency approach
(Bartolini and Drazen, 1997; Drazen, 1997; Drazen and Masson, 1994; Velasco and
Neut, 2004), showing that institutions per se are not enough. Typically a tough
policy today may worsen the trade-o® between credibility and °exibility tomorrow,
possibly due to a persistent unemployment increase or to debt accumulation. In this
case even an in°ation averse policymaker may be induced to engage in expansionary
policies.
Our work is based on the following premise: although well designed institutions
are important to deliver low in°ation, their de facto performance is endogenous to
2the economic and socio-political environment. Thus we estimate a model where
in°ation, a measure of de facto central bank independence and an index of de facto
exchange rate regime are simultaneously determined by a set of economic, socio-
political and institutional variables.
To our knowledge this is the ¯rst attempt to consider the structural interrelations
between the socio political environment, in°ation and de facto policies. We provide
several contributions to the literature. First we ¯nd that in°ation is generally ex-
plained by three factors: the degree of central bank independence, the exchange rate
regime and ¯scal policy. Second, success in reducing in°ation is crucial to support
both central bank independence and exchange rate stability. Third, socio-political
factors do not have a direct impact on in°ation but a®ect the central bank turnover
rate and, in turn, cause in°ation. As one might expect political turbulence hampers
central bank independence. The latter, instead, bene¯ts from the balance of pow-
ers between the executive and the parliament: presidential systems are associated
to lower central bank independence. Fourth, there are open-economy aspects that
a®ect in°ation beyond Romer's (1993) trade-openness celebrated result. However,
they do not have a direct impact on in°ation; instead they operate through the ex-
change rate regime channel. For instance, ¯nancial markets integration is associated
with more stable exchange rates and, in turn, with lower in°ation. By contrast, ¯-
nancial fragility is associated with more °exible exchange rate regimes, with adverse
e®ects on in°ation.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates the major
¯ndings of the literature on the determinants of in°ation, central bank independence
and openness. Section 3 illustrates the data set and the methodology used. Section
4 presents the empirical results; section 5 concludes.
2 In°ation, central bank independence and the
exchange rate regime
Empirical evidence on the determinants of in°ation emphasises three key factors.
The ¯rst is central bank de facto independence. Cukierman et al. (1992) show
that the central bank governor's turnover rate a®ects the in°ationary outcome.1
However, they also suggest that "...high in°ation may encourage processes that
make it easier for the government to in°uence monetary policy", thus pointing to
the joint endogeneity of in°ation and independence. In fact Cukierman (1992) (page
429) ¯nds that there is a two way Granger-causality between in°ation and central
bank independence as proxied by governor's turnover.
The second factor is openness. Romer (1993) suggests that the more the economy
1De jure independence (legal indicators) matters only for advanced economies.
3is open, the more it will su®er from the real depreciation that high-in°ation equilibria
bring about. Alfaro (2005), however, points out that the commitment device role
underlying Romer's intuition is probably played by the exchange rate regime rather
than by trade openness per sµ e.2 Again, there are reasons to believe that regime
choice and in°ation are jointly endogenous. On the one hand high in°ation countries
should self-impose monetary discipline by adopting ¯xed exchange rate regimes (see
Calvo and V¶ egh, 1999 and the vast literature on exchange rate stabilisation). On
the other hand it is more di±cult to sustain a peg in a high in°ation environment
(Dri±ll and Miller, 1993). Whichever of the two e®ects prevails, it would be di±cult
to argue that the regime choice is not in°uenced by in°ationary outcomes. The third
factor is ¯scal policy (Campillo and Miron, 1997). Alesina and Tabellini (1987) point
out that an in°ation bias arises when distortionary taxation is necessary to ¯nance
public expenditures. More recently, Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) stress that the
sole motivation of output and in°ation stabilisation is su±cient for ¯scal discretion
to destroy central bank commitment to low in°ation.
To account for endogeneity issues, we explicitly model the determinants of cen-
tral bank independence and exchange rate regime choice, while instrumenting for
¯scal policy variables. Our interpretation of de facto central bank independence is
inspired by the theoretical work of Lohmann (1992) who characterises a regime of
partial central bank independence, where the government always retains the option
to override the central bank's decisions at a ¯nite cost. She shows that in adverse
circumstances the central bank inevitably bends towards an accomodative mone-
tary stance. Thus de facto independence is determined by three clearly identi¯able
factors: i) changes in the \preferences" of the bank's principal, possibly due to
government turnover and to socio-political instability;3 ii) changes in economic con-
ditions; iii) changes in institutional arrangements which shape the political system
and determine the relative strength and internal cohesion of the executive. Cross-
country empirical evidence on de facto central bank independence seems to con¯rm
the signi¯cant role of political forces (see for instance Cukierman and Webb (1995)
and Keefer and Stasavage, 2003).
With respect to the determinants of exchange rate regimes, we follow the pioneer-
ing work of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) who identify
de facto exchange rate regimes. In a similar setting Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004) inves-
tigate the role of economic fundamentals, ranging from standard optimal currency
area theories to the more recent ¯nancial fragility approach.
The system for the simultaneous determination of in°ation, de facto central bank
independence and de facto exchange rate regime can be written in compact form:
2A more radical criticism comes from Terra (1998) who argues that Romer's e®ect could be
explained by the responses of severely indebted countries to the debt crises of the eighties.
3Lossani et al. (2000) have shown that under partial central bank independence, government






Where y denotes a (row) vector de¯ning in°ation, central bank independence and
de facto exchange rate regime, x denotes a vector of economic controls, z a vector
of political and institutional factors, including ¯scal policy variables. Finally ² is
the vector of error terms. Matrix A captures the simultaneous interaction among
in°ation, central bank independence and exchange rate regime choice.
3 Data and methodology
Our data set covers economic political and institutional data for a large number of
countries over the period 1970 - 2000. All variables are ¯ve year averages as we
are not interested in short term e®ects. Economic data are drawn from standard
sources (IMF and World Bank). Political data are taken mainly from the Database of
Political Institutions (DPI), the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS),
and Polity IV data set. The appendix provides a detailed description of data sources,
variable construction and the list of countries included in our analysis.
3.1 In°ation and policy variables





where ¼ is the annual in°ation rate.4
We proxy the degree of de facto central bank independence with the turnover
rate of central bank governor (see Cukierman et al., 1992).
With regard to the de facto exchange rate regime variable, we use Reinhart and
Rogo®'s classi¯cation that infers the de facto regime from parallel market exchange
rates.5 A higher value of the variable (defactoreg) denotes a more °exible exchange
rate regime.6
To identify the ¯scal determinants of in°ation we use both the level and the
volatility of government-consumption/GDP ratio (gov¯ncon and volgov¯ncon re-
spectively). The ¯rst variable obviously identi¯es the Alesina and Tabellini (1987)
4In°ation (with the exception of cases of de°ation) takes values between 0 and 1; a 100%
in°ation rate corresponds an index value of 0.5.
5Alternatively, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) adopt a statistical approach based on clus-
ter analysis of the volatility of exchange rate and reserves.
6The original classi¯cation groups exchange rate regimes into 5 classes, coded from 1 to 5. As
we take ¯ve-years averages our variable defactoreg can take any value between 1 and 5.
5channel. The second is meant to capture the spirit of the Dixit and Lambertini
(2003b) ¯scal policy e®ect on in°ation. In addition, we consider the possibility that
public debt a®ects in°ation, as in Campillo and Miron (1997). In this regard, we
experiment with two variables: a standard debt-to-GDP ratio and a dummy (Ddebt)
taking value 1 for severely indebted countries (these are identi¯ed as in Terra (1998)).
3.2 Political and institutional variables
Lohmann's (1992) model provides a useful reference for the identi¯cation of politico-
institutional mechanisms that a®ect de facto central bank independence. In her
framework, the central bank is partially independent because its decisions can be
overridden by a political principal (i.e. the government) at a ¯nite political cost.
Therefore, whenever the preferred policy outcomes of the principal are su±ciently
di®erent from those of the central bank, the de facto independence of the latter is
curtailed. Building on this interpretation, de facto independence is crucially a®ected
by those factors (or circumstances) that create a tension between the bank and her
principal about preferred policies. In our view two factors are likely to a®ect de
facto independence: political instability and institutional arrangements that shape
the political system.
First, political instability shortens the time horizon of the incumbent and lowers
economic e±ciency. As a result, political pressures for an accomodative monetary
stance increase and this should reduce de facto independence. Operationally, we
consider two indicators of political instability. One is the expected duration in
o±ce of the incumbent, proxied by the frequency of head-of-the-executive changes
(variable govter). The other is the degree of social unrest in a country (variable
sociopolrisk), measured as the principal component of various disaggregate indicators
(assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, purges, riots, revolutions and anti-
government demonstrations). The expected coe±cient on both these variables is
positive, denoting that de facto central bank independence is lower in more unstable
countries.
Second, political and institutional arrangements that determine the distribution
of political power and the fragmentation of decision-making are also likely to a®ect
de facto independence. In fact, the political cost of overriding central bank deci-
sions is likely to increase when political power is more dispersed, i.e. when enforcing
a political threat to the central bank becomes more di±cult. In other words, we
expect de facto independence to be higher (and therefore central bank turnover to
be lower) when the relative position of the executive (the principal) is weaker. We
will consider two indicators of relative weakness (or strength) of the executive. The
Her¯ndal index in the government (herfgov)7 measures the concentration of the rul-
7Foramlly de¯ned as the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the government.
6ing coalition and should therefore display a positive coe±cient in the central bank
turnover regression. The variable system identi¯es di®erent institutional settings
(presidential, assembly-elected, and parliamentary), with higher values correspond-
ing to parliamentary regimes. Since parliamentary regimes imply a weaker position
for the executive, our hypothesis is that the variable system should display a negative
coe±cient.
3.3 Other economic variables
An important explanatory variable in our analysis is openness. We use two comple-
mentary measures: the standard indicator of total trade volume to GDP (open), and
an index of capital account openness (kaopen), taken from Chinn and Ito (2002). In
both cases a higher value of the indicator denotes greater openness.
We also consider a measure of liability dollarisation proxied by the ratio of foreign
liabilities over money (forliab).8 This will appear in the equation explaining the
choice of the exchange rate regime.
3.4 Methodology
Our choice of the estimation method is obviously driven by concern for the endo-
geneity issue. We use GMM estimators; it is well known in fact that standard 2SLS
and 3SLS estimators can be derived as special cases of a GMM estimator, given
an appropriate choice of the weighting matrix. Since the GMM estimator opti-
mally chooses the weighting matrix, asymptotically it is never worse and generally
strictly better than the traditional 3SLS estimator. However, given that 3SLS may
have better ¯nite sample properties under the assumption of heteroskedasticity (see
Wooldridge, 2002), we also computed 3SLS estimates.
GMM estimates use White's heterosckedasticity-consistent matrix. As our esti-
mates do not require particular computational complexity, in computing the GLS
weighting matrix and coe±cient vector, we allow for simultaneous updating of both
coe±cient and weighting matrix at each iteration.
The system of equations has been estimated as a pooled cross section. The reason
is that several institutional and political variables vary much more across countries
than over time, therefore panel data models that focus on within-country variability
(i.e. ¯xed e®ects) do not seem appropriate. Moreover, we consider a large number
of di®erent institutional and political factors which explain a great deal of countries'
heterogeneity.9
8We also experimented other other economic controls (i.e. GDP growth, level of development)
without ¯nding signi¯cant e®ects.
9The same approach is followed by, among others, Alesina and Wagner (2005) and Lundberg
and Squire (2003).
73.5 Instrument choice
In addition to the dependent variables of the system, we treat as endogenous the
variables de¯ning the ¯scal stance (both the level and the volatility of government
¯nal consumption) and the measure of liability dollarisation. In addition to the
obvious theoretical reasons, the Hausman test always rejected the null of exogeneity
for these variables.
The presence of endogenous variables raises the question of instrument validity.
Finding good instruments is always di±cult. A popular choice is to use lagged
values of the endogenous variables. However these are at best weakly exogenous
(see Lundberg and Squire (2003)).10
Therefore, in addition to the exogenous variables, we integrate the set of instru-
ments with some variables that are clearly exogenous such as a country's distance
from equator (see La Porta et al. (1999) for a discussion), time dummies and two
variables that capture the number constraints to the executive (xrreg and polcon).
Following Persson and Tabellini (2001) we instrument our measures of the ¯scal
stance using political and institutional variables. In addition we selected two mea-
sures of structural economic conditions (log GNP per capita averaged over the entire
sample, terms of trade growth) and a measure (cycle) that captures the average cycli-
cal position. This latter variable, being averaged over ¯ve years, has an extremely
low correlation with the in°ation rate (1.8%), but can be used as a good instrument
for the volatility of the ¯scal spending.
We are then left with two questions. First, is our choice of instruments good?
Second, are there any other endogenous variables in the system? To answer these
questions we rely on a few tests. We run an F-test on the regression of endogenous
variables on instruments and we always reject the null hypothesis that the esti-
mated coe±cients are jointly insigni¯cant. Then, we always run the Sargan test for
instrument validity, and never reject the null that our overidentifying restrictions are
correct. Finally, we apply the Hausman test to check for the endogeneity of other
regressors, always rejecting the endogeneity hypothesis . While we reckon that none
of these tests is the ultimate proof of instruments validity, we take this as a good
diagnostics that supports our choices, given our theoretical priors.
4 Results
For expositional convenience we adopt a piecemeal approach in presenting our re-
sults. Thus we start with a single equation estimate for in°ation, then we consider
a two equation system explaining in°ation and central bank independence, ¯nally
we turn to the fully-°edged three-equation system.
10The Sargan test often rejected the instrument validity when adding lagged values.
84.1 In°ation and central bank independence
The starting point in our analysis is a single-equation estimate of in°ation in line
with the existing literature.
Inflationi;t =¯0 + ¯1CBturni;t + ¯2Openi;t + ¯3Govfinconi;t
+ ¯4V olgovfinconi;t + ¯5Ddebti;t + ²i;t
(2)
Consistently with the discussion in section 3.2, at this stage we assume that
institutional and socio-political variables a®ect in°ation through their in°uence on
de facto central bank independence. Therefore we use them as instruments.11 We
will relax this assumption later in this section.
The results presented in table 2 are broadly in line with previous empirical ev-
idence (Campillo and Miron, 1997; Romer, 1993). In°ation is positively related to
central banker turnover and to both measures of the ¯scal stance,12 and is negatively
a®ected by openness. Finally, in line with Terra (1998), we also ¯nd that, beyond a
certain threshold, the level of debt a®ects in°ation.13
The next step is to characterise the simultaneous interaction between central
bank policies and in°ation outcomes. In fact, as already noted by Cukierman et
al. (1992), \less central bank independence contributes to higher in°ation ... high
in°ation may encourage processes that make it easier for the government to in°uence
monetary policy" resulting in a faster central banker turnover.
We therefore estimate a two-equation system based on equation 2 and:
CBturni;t =°0 + °1Inflationi;t + °2Govteri;t
+ °3Systemi;t + °2Sociopolriski;t + °5Herfgovi;t + ´i;t
(3)
Table 3 presents the results. Our single-equation estimates for in°ation are con-
¯rmed, with the exception of the debt variable. Turning to the second equation, we
¯nd that in°ation does indeed a®ect the central banker turnover rate. Political and
institutional variables also matter, and the results con¯rm our priors. Political and
socio political instability (variables govter and sociopolrisk) induce a higher turnover
rate. The negative sign associated with system suggests that the central bank is de
facto less independent when the executive is stronger vis µ a vis the parliament. In
11See see table 2 for the detailed list of instruments. The Hausman test con¯rms the endogeneity
of the instrumented variables. The same test also con¯rms that openness is exogenous, supporting
our modeling choice.
12We checked for multicollinearity between the two measures of ¯scal policy. Results of this and
the next paragraphs appear to be immune from this problem.
13We could not ¯nd evidence of a systematic relation between the debt-to-GDP ratio and in°a-
tion.
9this regard, our ¯ndings integrate an established view about the economic e±ciency
of political systems. In fact Persson and Tabellini (2001) argue that in presiden-
tial systems, where governments are more accountable to the electorate, the level
of public expenditure and distortionary taxation is lower. This in turn should limit
in°ationary pressures. Our estimates, instead, highlight that presidential systems
are associated to lower central bank independence with adverse e®ects on in°ation.
Finally, the variable herfgov has a positive and signi¯cant sign: when the com-
position of the executive is relatively more homogeneous, government's ability to
put pressure on the central bank increases, and central bank independence de facto
falls.
So far we have implicitly assumed that political and institutional variables a®ect
the in°ation rate only through the degree of central bank independence. To check
whether these variables also have a direct e®ect on in°ation, we have estimated the
system by adding political variables directly to the in°ation equation. As shown by
columns 2, 3, 4 and 5 in table 3 these variables are never signi¯cant.
Similarly we also added the ¯scal variables to equation 3, in order to detect
any additional ¯scal policy e®ect on central bank independence. The estimated
coe±cients were never signi¯cant whereas previous ¯ndings were con¯rmed (results
available upon request).
Summing up, the estimate of the two-equation system con¯rms the hypothesis of
a simultaneous determination of de facto central bank independence and in°ation.
Moreover, institutional and political factors a®ect in°ation through their in°uence
on de facto central bank independence:
² Socio political instability reduces the governor's turnover rate.
² More stable governments are associated to greater central bank independence.
² Stronger concentration of the decision-making power in the hands of the gov-
ernment reduces de facto central bank independence.
4.2 Openness and the exchange rate regime
We now address the role of openness in determining in°ation. From the in°ation
equation, we have so far omitted the exchange rate regime variable, that could in
principle interact with both in°ation and the degree of openness. Including the de
facto exchange rate regime variable (defactoreg) in the in°ation equation - column
6 in table 3 - we see that open looses signi¯cance.
These results con¯rm Alfaro's (2005) ¯nding that the role of commitment device
is primarily played by the exchange rate regime and not by openness. Moreover we
now reject Terra's (1998) criticism as the debt dummy is never signi¯cant.
10Theoretical priors and empirical evidence (Husain et al., 2005) suggest that the
exchange rate regime should in fact be treated as endogenous to the in°ationary
outcome. To account for this, we estimate a 3-equation system, including (2),14
(3) and a third equation estimating the determinants of the exchange rate regime
choice:
Defactoregi;t = ±0+±1Inflationi;t+±2Openi;t+±3Forliabi;t+±1Kaopeni;t+ui;t (4)
Following the literature,15 we assume that the exchange rate regime is related
to some economic controls (capturing optimum currency area and ¯nancial fragility
theories), and to in°ation. We treat the currency mismatch indicator (forliab) as
potentially endogenous16 while the index of capital controls (kaopen) is assumed
exogenous to the de facto regime, as in Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004). In our speci¯cation
cbturn a®ects defactoreg through the rate of in°ation. However we also checked for
an additional direct e®ect of de facto central bank independence on the exchange
rate regime, but the cbturn coe±cient into the exchange rate regime equation was
not signi¯cant (results available upon request).17
Table 4 presents the result of the 3 equation system.
After the introduction of the exchange rate regime equation, in°ation is now
determined by de facto central bank independence, by the ¯scal variables (gov¯ncon
and volgov¯ncon), and by defactoreg. Our previous ¯ndings on the determinants of
central bank independence are con¯rmed, with the exception of herfgov that now
looses signi¯cance. Turning to the exchange rate regime equation, we obtain the
following results:
² High in°ation calls for de facto °exibility.
² More open economies are associated with more ¯xed exchange rate regimes.
Thus we con¯rm an indirect link between trade openness and in°ation.
² In contrast with conventional wisdom (i.e. the impossible trinity theorem),
the capital account openness indicator (kaopen) is positively related to the
propensity to peg. This result, which is akin to Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004),
14After controlling for the exchange rate regime, openness is never signi¯cant in any of our
speci¯cation of the in°ation equation. Therefore we dropped it from equation (2), along with the
debt dummy.
15See Alesina and Wagner (2005); Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004); Carmignani et al. (2005)
16The Hausman test con¯rmed our prior.
17Berger et al. (2000), in a single equation framework ¯nd a positive e®ect of cbturn on the
probability of observing a peg. However their emphasis is on de jure exchange rate regimes and
they do not explicitly model the link between central bank independence, in°ation and the exchange
rate regime.
11could be explained by the attempt of many countries to attract capital °ows
by integrating in the international ¯nancial markets and using the peg to
stabilise expectations, with bene¯cial e®ects on in°ation.
² Unlike Alesina and Wagner (2005), we ¯nd that liability dollarisation calls for
greater de facto °exibility. Recent contributions (Eichengreen and Hausmann,
2005; Hausmann et al., 2001) suggest that countries facing high risks of adverse
balance sheet e®ects are more reluctant to °oat. However, a natural extension
of this argument would be that, over the medium term, economies who cannot
escape ¯nancial fragility are less likely to sustain a stable exchange rate. As
variables are ¯ve-year averages, this could be the driving factor behind our
results.
Summing up, we ¯nd that open economy aspects a®ect in°ation through the
de facto exchange rate regime choice. It seems that the traditional trade openness
channel is only part of the story: ¯nancial markets integration and ¯nancial fragility
also play a signi¯cant role.
4.3 Robustness checks
As mentioned in section 3, 3SLS may have better ¯nite sample properties than
GMM estimates under the assumption of heteroskedasticity. We have therefore
re-estimated the 3-equation system using 3SLS. Column 2 in table Table 4 shows
that the results are con¯rmed with the exception of coe±cients on gov¯ncon in the
in°ation equation.
Within the variable defactoreg, freely °oating exchange rate regimes are treated
as distinct from \freely falling", the latter identifying countries with °exible exchange
rates and high in°ation. This \arti¯cial distinction" among °exible exchange rate
regimes could a®ect some of our results. We therefore recoded defactoreg, grouping
freely °oating and freely falling regimes into a single category. The results (column
3 in table 4) show no signi¯cant change with respect to the benchmark equation,
with the exception of kaopen in the exchange rate equation.
We also checked whether the e®ect of cbturn on in°ation might be driven by high
in°ation countries, as suggested by de Haan and Kooi (2000). In column 4 in table 4
we show the results for the 3-equation system where we have excluded high-in°ation
countries.18 All variables remain signi¯cant with the exception of gov¯ncon in the
in°ation equation that becomes marginally insigni¯cant.
Although defactoreg can take any value between 1 and 5, persistency in exchange
rate regime choices, could generate clustering around the originally coded values. In
18This is equivalent to estimate the system of equations without freely falling regimes in defac-
toreg variable.
12principle this could induce a distortion similar to the introduction of a categorical
dependent variable. A similar argument can be applied to cbturn. To check for this
we estimated an ordered logit single equation for defactoreg and for cbturn obtaining
results (available upon request) that are identical to those in column 1 of table 4.
Finally we tested whether Cbturn has a di®erential e®ect on in°ation in indus-
trialised countries. We carried out the analysis in two steps. First, in the in°ation
equation, we interacted Cbturn with two dummies for industrialised (Dind) and
non industrialised countries (Dnonind). Table 5 shows that while Cbturnnonind re-
mains positive and signi¯cant, Cbturnind is non-signi¯cant, while all other results are
broadly con¯rmed. In the second step we checked the global e®ect of the distinction
between industrialised and non-industrialised countries. In the second column of ta-
ble 5 we re-estimated the baseline model by adding a dummy for non-industrialised
countries in every equation. The results broadly con¯rm our original ¯ndings. Note
that the country dummy is signi¯cant only in the in°ation equation. These results
are open to two di®erent interpretations: on the one hand in industrialised countries
Cbturn could be a poor proxy for de facto independence.19 On the other hand indus-
trialised countries might be characterised by intrinsic preferences for low in°ation
(Posen, 1993). We leave this issue for future research.
5 Conclusions
Previous empirical research has pointed out that de jure monetary institutions may
fail to deliver the expected outcomes. This could be explained by the endogene-
ity of monetary institutions to the economic environment. We ¯nd that in°ation
and de facto monetary institutions are simultaneously determined by a set of \fun-
damentals", i.e. ¯scal policy, socio-political stability, the underlying institutional
arrangements and open economy aspects.
Such \fundamentals" operate through distinct and clearly identi¯ed channels.
We broadly con¯rm the Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) argument that ¯scal dis-
cretion may destroy monetary commitment through its direct e®ect on in°ation.
Socio-political and institutional factors a®ect in°ation through their in°uence on de
facto central bank independence. We also ¯nd that, in addition to trade openness,
¯nancial institutions matter. In fact, integration with international capital markets
has double-edged e®ects on in°ation. On the one hand, it induces monetary policy
to stabilise the exchange rate. On the other hand, when things go wrong, ¯nancial
fragility makes stable exchange rates unsustainable and triggers adverse in°ation
equilibria. After the Argentinean disaster this might not come as a surprise.
19We are grateful to Alex Cukierman for raising this point.
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17Table 1: Descriptive stats: all countries
Var. Mean SD. Dev Min 25 50 75 Max N.Obs.
CBturn 0:24 0:26 0:00 0:00 0:20 0:40 1:40 633
In°ation 0:12 0:14 ¡0:05 0:04 0:08 0:14 0:92 979
Cycle 0:50 0:20 0:00 0:40 0:60 0:60 1:00 980
Defactoreg 2:31 1:23 1:00 1:00 2:00 3:00 5:00 717
Forliab 0:88 1:05 0:02 0:23 0:51 1:06 7:00 710
Govter 0:16 0:20 0:00 0:00 0:20 0:20 1:00 947
Herfgov 0:83 0:27 0:00 0:67 1:0 1:0 1:0 814
Kaopen ¡0:04 1:46 ¡1:79 ¡1:09 ¡0:47 0:99 2:66 773
Lat 0:28 0:19 0:01 0:13 0:24 0:44 0:72 978
Open 0:39 0:23 0:06 0:22 0:32 0:52 1:35 860
Polity ¡0:43 7:49 ¡10:00 ¡7:00 ¡3:80 8:00 10:00 866
Sociopolrisk 0:02 1:14 ¡0:72 ¡0:72 ¡0:44 0:26 9:96 881
System 0:81 0:86 0:00 0:00 0:60 2:00 2:00 789
Ttg 0:01 0:08 ¡0:17 ¡0:02 0:00 0:03 1:06 971
Volgov¯ncon 0:13 0:08 0:02 0:06 0:10 0:17 0:45 789
Gov¯ncon 0:15 0:06 0:06 0:11 0:15 0:19 0:31 795
Polcon 0:26 0:32 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:59 0:89 870
Loggnppc 7:23 1:35 4:64 6:14 7:14 8:18 9:95 954
Xrreg 2:34 0:59 1:00 2:00 2:00 3:00 3:00 866
Table 2: In°ation equation









Dep. var.: Volgov¯ncon Gov¯ncon
Endogenous vars.: dep. var., Volgov¯ncon, Gov¯ncon
Instruments: exogenous vars, cycle, sociopolrisk, govter, average log gnp pro capite,
latitude, time dummies
GMM White's heterosckedasticity consistent estimates.
Time dummies included but not reported
18Table 3: Two equation system: in°ation, central banker turnover rate
Variable Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6
Dep Var: In°ation
Constant ¡0:155¤ ¡0:174¤ ¡0:149¤ ¡0:131 ¡0:204¤¤ ¡0:209¤¤¤
(0:082) (0:089) (0:088) (0:084) (0:102) (0:055)
CBturn 0:504¤¤¤ 0:669¤¤¤ 0:527¤¤¤ 0:469¤¤¤ 0:509¤¤¤ 0:364¤¤¤
(0:112) (0:143) (0:117) (0:112) (0:119) (0:094)
Volgov¯ncon 0:910¤¤¤ 0:830¤¤ 0:851¤¤ 0:810¤¤¤ 0:992¤¤¤ 0:852¤¤¤
(0:291) (0:344) (0:363) (0:303) (0:313) (0:243)
Gov¯ncon 0:797¤¤ 0:933¤¤ 0:760¤ 0:797¤¤ 0:930¤¤ 0:362¤
(0:360) (0:391) (0:401) (0:345) (0:406) (0:216)
Defactoreg 0:055¤¤¤
(0:009)
Open ¡0:163¤¤¤ ¡0:171¤¤¤ ¡0:157¤¤ ¡0:157¤¤¤ ¡0:175¤¤¤ ¡0:051
(0:060) (0:065) (0:066) (0:058) (0:065) (0:056)
Ddebt 0:023 0:012 0:023 0:021 0:024 0:006
(0:022) (0:023) (0:022) (0:022) (0:023) (0:018)
Pol. Control ¡0:096 ¡0:003 ¡0:009 0:027
(0:074) (0:008) (0:011) (0:031)
Dep Var: Cbturn
Constant 0:062 0:055 0:061 0:050 0:076¤ 0:071¤
(0:042) (0:040) (0:041) (0:044) (0:045) (0:039)
In°ation 0:534¤¤ 0:538¤¤ 0:553¤¤ 0:590¤¤ 0:491¤ 0:538¤¤¤
(0:272) (0:263) (0:278) (0:279) (0:278) (0:120)
Govter 0:260¤¤¤ 0:283¤¤¤ 0:247¤¤¤ 0:256¤¤¤ 0:272¤¤¤ 0:290¤¤¤
(0:089) (0:090) (0:091) (0:089) (0:091) (0:074)
System ¡0:039¤¤ ¡0:036¤¤ ¡0:038¤¤ ¡0:033¤ ¡0:041¤¤ ¡0:035¤¤¤
(0:018) (0:017) (0:018) (0:020) (0:019) (0:013)
Sociopolrisk 0:023¤¤¤ 0:019¤¤¤ 0:025¤¤¤ 0:023¤¤¤ 0:024¤¤¤ 0:030¤¤¤
(0:008) (0:007) (0:009) (0:008) (0:008) (0:008)
Herfgov 0:058¤ 0:054¤ 0:057¤ 0:057¤ 0:044 0:023
(0:034) (0:032) (0:034) (0:034) (0:037) (0:034)
System obs 412 412 412 412 412 379
N. obs eq1 364 364 364 364 364 340
Continued on the next page
19Variable Col1 Col2 Col3 Col4 Col5 Col6
N. obs eq2 412 412 412 412 412 379
J statistic 15:043 13:786 15:147 14:583 13:957 13:514
Pol. Control: Col 2 = Govter, Col 3 = Sociopolrisk, Col 4 = System, Col 5 = Herfgov
GMM White's heterosckedasticity consistent estimates. Time dummies included but not reported
Endogenous variables: dependent variables, Volgov¯ncon Gov¯ncon.
Instruments: exogenous regressors, time dummies, latitude, cycle, average log gnp pro capite,
polcon, xrreg, terms of trade growth.
20Table 4: Three equation system: in°ation, central banker turnover rate, de facto
exchange rate regime
Variable Eq1 Eq2 Eq3 Eq4
Dep Var: In°ation
Constant ¡0:235¤¤¤ ¡0:231¤¤¤ ¡0:290¤¤¤ ¡0:098¤
(0:051) (0:055) (0:069) (0:053)
CBturn 0:324¤¤¤ 0:315¤¤¤ 0:366¤¤¤ 0:295¤¤¤
(0:079) (0:075) (0:094) (0:085)
Volgov¯ncon 0:716¤¤¤ 0:826¤¤¤ 0:847¤¤¤ 0:570¤¤¤
(0:159) (0:181) (0:191) (0:147)
Gov¯ncon 0:325¤ 0:127 0:468¤¤ 0:034
(0:192) (0:197) (0:233) (0:168)
Defactoreg 0:074¤¤¤ 0:079¤¤¤ 0:082¤¤¤ 0:041¤¤¤
(0:011) (0:012) (0:016) (0:012)
Dep Var: Cbturn
Constant 0:086¤¤ 0:101¤¤ 0:091¤¤ 0:074¤
(0:038) (0:044) (0:038) (0:038)
In°ation 0:509¤¤¤ 0:539¤¤¤ 0:555¤¤¤ 0:538¤¤¤
(0:171) (0:192) (0:169) (0:175)
Govter 0:279¤¤¤ 0:238¤¤¤ 0:235¤¤¤ 0:238¤¤¤
(0:078) (0:075) (0:077) (0:079)
System ¡0:042¤¤¤ ¡0:040¤¤¤ ¡0:036¤¤ ¡0:040¤¤
(0:015) (0:015) (0:015) (0:016)
Sociopolrisk 0:027¤¤¤ 0:022¤¤¤ 0:025¤¤¤ 0:025¤¤¤
(0:008) (0:008) (0:008) (0:008)
Herfgov 0:029 0:042 0:016 0:061 ¤
(0:035) (0:037) (0:035) (0:035)
Dep Var: Defactoreg
Constant 1:888¤¤¤ 1:855¤¤¤ 2:059¤¤¤ 1:537¤¤¤
(0:165) (0:191) (0:176) (0:227)
Open ¡1:733¤¤¤ ¡1:636¤¤¤ ¡1:736¤¤¤ ¡1:312¤¤¤
(0:362) (0:363) (0:343) (0:319)
Forliab 0:566¤¤¤ 0:513¤¤¤ 0:333¤¤ 0:446¤¤¤
(0:151) (0:150) (0:149) (0:134)
Continued on the next page
21Variable Eq1 Eq2 Eq3 Eq4
Kaopen ¡0:191¤¤¤ ¡0:094¤ ¡0:091 ¡0:171¤¤¤
(0:059) (0:055) (0:069) (0:058)
In°ation 4:760¤¤¤ 5:117¤¤¤ 4:190¤¤¤ 5:793¤¤¤
(0:866) (0:871) (1:087) (1:965)
System obs 475 475 472 471
N. obs eq1 330 330 330 292
N. obs eq2 388 388 388 390
N. obs eq3 400 400 397 349
J Statistic 25.81 NA 29.44 29.91
Eq1: baseline, Eq2 baseline 3SLS, Eq3 baseline with new de¯nition of Defactoreg,
Eq4: baseline excluding high in°ation.
GMM White's heterosckedasticity consistent estimates.
Time dummies included but not reported
Endogenous variables: dependent variables, Volgov¯ncon Gov¯ncon, Forliab.
Instruments: exogenous regressors, time dummies, latitude, cycle, average log gnp pro capite,
Ddebt, polcon, xrreg (excluded in eq 4), terms of trade growth.
22Table 5: Central bank independence: the role of industrialised countries
Variable Eq1 Variable Eq2
Dep Var: In°ation
Constant ¡0:241¤¤¤ Constant ¡0:326¤¤¤
(0:046) (0:061)





Volgov¯ncon 0:152 Volgov¯ncon ¡0:005
(0:281) (0:311)
Gov¯ncon 0:631¤¤ Gov¯ncon 0:837¤¤¤
(0:253) (0:282)





Constant 0:052 Constant 0:030
(0:036) (0:041)
In°ation 0:798¤¤¤ In°ation 0:704¤¤¤
(0:135) (0:166)
Govter 0:224¤¤¤ Govter 0:263¤¤¤
(0:073) (0:081)
System ¡0:021 System ¡0:020
(0:014) (0:013)
Sociopolrisk 0:023¤¤¤ Sociopolrisk 0:021¤¤¤
(0:008) (0:008)





Continued on the next page
23Variable Eq1 Variable Eq2
Constant 1:780¤¤¤ Constant 1:769¤¤¤
(0:155) (0:202)
Open ¡1:492¤¤¤ Open ¡1:585¤¤¤
(0:329) (0:367)
Forliab 0:419¤¤¤ Forliab 0:449¤¤
(0:117) (0:184)
Kaopen ¡0:130¤¤¤ Kaopen ¡0:119¤¤
(0:047) (0:048)




System obs 475 475
N. obs eq1 330 330
N. obs eq2 388 388
N. obs eq3 400 400
J Statistic 33.32 33.68
GMM White's heterosckedasticity consistent estimates.
Time dummies included but not reported
Endogenous variables: dependent variables, Volgov¯ncon Gov¯ncon, Forliab.
Instruments: exogenous regressors, time dummies, latitude, cycle, average log gnp pro capite,
Ddebt, polcon, xrreg, terms of trade growth.
24Table 6: List of countries
Algeria Estonia Korea Romania
Argentina Finland Kyrgyz Rep. Russia
Armenia France Latvia Slovak Rep.
Australia Gambia Lesotho Slovenia
Austria Ghana Libya South Africa
Azerbaijan Greece Lithuania Spain
Belarus Guatemala Malawi Sri Lanka
Belgium Haiti Malaysia Swaziland
Bolivia Honduras Mauritius Syria
Brazil Hungary Mexico Tanzania
Chile Iceland Moldova Thailand
China Indonesia Morocco Turkey
Colombia Iran Nepal Uganda
Costa Rica Ireland Netherlands United Kingdom
Cyprus Israel New Zealand United States
Czech Rep. Italy Nigeria Uruguay
Denmark Jamaica Pakistan Venezuela
Dominican Rep Jordan Peru Zambia





Corrinf In°ation (scaled) IFS line 64
CBturn Central bank turnover rate Ghosh et. al 2002
Defactoreg Index of de facto exchange rate
regime
Reinhart and Rogo® (2004)
Forliab Foreign liabilities over money
(lagged)
IFS line 16c + line 26c
Kaopen Capital account openness index Authors' calculation based on
Chinn and Ito (2002)
Open Openess , imports + ex-
ports/2gdp
WDI
Gdpg Gdp growth WDI
Gov¯ncon Government ¯nal consumption
over GDP
WDI
Volgov¯ncon Volatility of government ¯nal
consumption over GDP, 5 years
moving standard deviation
WDI
Cycle Log deviations from HP trend Authors' calculations from WDI
data
Ttg Terms of trade growth WDI
Lat Latitude La Porta et. al. (1999)
Loggnppc Log GNP per capita WDI
26Political Variables
Variable Description Source
System Typology of political system DPI
Ass Assassinations CNTS archive
Genstr General Strikes CNTS archive
Guerwar Guerrilla Warfare CNTS archive
Purg Purges CNTS archive
Riots Riots CNTS archive
Revol Revolutions CNTS archive
Agdem Anti-Government Demonstrations CNTS archive
Sociopolrisk index of socio political risk, ¯rst principal
component of: Ass, Genstr, Guerwar, Purg,
Riots, Revol, Agdem
Authors' calculation
Govter measure of political change. Records the
change in either the executive or in the in-
stitutional system or in the ideological ori-
entation of the executive
Authors' calculations
Herfgov Her¯ndal Index for government DPI
xrreg Regulation of executive recruitment POLITY IV
Polcon Political constraint index Witold Henisz
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